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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a theory of the life cycle of the …rm based on incentive con-
straints. The optimal sale of the …rm is restricted by entrepreneurial moral hazard
and a lack of commitment regarding future divestment. This leads to a dynamic
ine¢ciency that causes the entrepreneur to delay and to stagger the sale of the …rm.
The analysis provides a common explanation for a range of empirical phenomena
related to initial public o¤erings (IPO’s), such as the waiting time until …rms go
public, lock-up periods, operating underperformance of IPO’s and post-IPO divest-
ment. The equilibrium divestment process is shown to be (constrained) ine¢cient:
entrepreneurs sell too late and too much of the …rm. Recommendations for …nancial
regulation that restore e¢ciency are derived.
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yCentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands,
phone: +31 13 4668205, fax: +31 13 4663042, email: wagner@kub.nlThe rich evidence on initial public o¤erings (IPO’s) poses interesting and controversial
questions, such as: What determines the decision to go public? Why do …rms wait until
they seek listing? Why do entrepreneurs only sell a part of their stake at the IPO and
unwind further positions later on? Why does the performance of …rms decline after the
IPO?
While IPO-prospectuses typically stress the need to obtain …nancing for new projects
as the main reason for going public (Roell, 1996), there is broad evidence that IPO’s are in
fact used by the initial owners to sell out the …rm. For example, Mikkelson et. al. (1997)
report for the U.S. that 10 years after the IPO the initial owners’ stake in the …rm is
only 18%, compared to 68% before the IPO. This large reduction is hardly surprising since
founders of …rms have a strong motive to sell the …rm in order to reduce their exposure to
…rm-speci…c risk and to gain liquidity. One would therefore furthermore expect that …rms
are taken public soon after the foundation and once being public, the initial owners sell
most of their stake immediately. However, Pagano et. al. (1995 ) report an average age
of 33 years for …rms that went public in Italy (similar numbers are obtained by Rydqvist
and Högholm, 1995, for Sweden). In addition, Mikkelson et. al. (1997) …nd that owners
divest a large part of the …rm subsequent to the IPO (Rydqvist and Högholm, 1995, even
report that the initial owner hardly divests at the IPO at all). This raises the question
of why do owners postpone the sale of …rm instead of selling as soon as possible. Further
puzzling evidence comes from the operating performance of IPO’s. Across countries there
seems to be a strong tendency for the operating performance of …rms to drop after the IPO
(Jain and Kini, 1994, Pagano et. al., 1995, Mikkelson et. al., 1997). Possible explanations
are based on window-dressing of earnings and the entrepreneur’s desire to time the IPO
such to let it coincide with a peak in the performance. However, rational investors should
anticipate such motives and adjust their evaluation of the …rm’s prospects accordingly,
rendering any motive for the entrepreneur to trick investors obsolete.
In this paper we provide a common explanation for the above issues (and other puz-
zling evidence related to IPO’s) based on entrepreneurial moral hazard. We consider an
entrepreneur who wants to divest her …rm but faces the problem that a reduction in her
stake in the …rm also lowers her incentives to exert e¤ort. Since with e¢cient markets the
entrepreneur has to fully bear the arising e¢ciency losses, this will constrain her in selling
the …rm unless also the control of the …rm is changed. The latter is rather uncommon for
young and small …rms (for which entrepreneurship is most common) since it results in a
loss of entrepreneurial human capital. The entrepreneur’s incentive to divest is further-
more limited because an entrepreneur has typically several opportunities to sell the …rm
in the course of time. While the e¢ciency losses of selling at the IPO may be fully inter-
1nalized, subsequent divestment by the entrepreneur (such as for example through seasoned
o¤erings) reduces her e¤ort further and poses a negative externality on the existing share-
holders. Therefore, if the entrepreneur cannot commit herself to retain her stake after the
IPO (especially younger …rms and those not a¢liated with a mature parent …rm or backed
by venture capitalists may e¤ectively lack the ability to make such commitments), investors
will further reduce their valuation of the …rm at the IPO in order to be compensated for
the additional e¢ciency losses.
We show that, as a consequence, the entrepreneur will stagger her divestment over
time, i.e., she does not exclusively sell at the IPO but uses the secondary market and/or
seasoned o¤erings for additional divestment. The entrepreneur’s lack of commitment has
furthermore implications for the decision to go public. In early stages of the life of the …rm,
when the proceeds from investment and e¤ort are still far o¤, the entrepreneur’s valuation
of the …rm is low (because she has to stay undiversi…ed and illiquid for a long time) and
hence the potential bene…ts from selling the …rm are high. However, this also means that
the entrepreneur has a high incentive to divest subsequently to the IPO. Investors anticipate
that and will lower their valuation of the …rm accordingly. We show that the second e¤ect
dominates the …rst, which causes the gains from going public to be low initially. Instead of
going public immediately after the foundation of the …rm, the entrepreneur may therefore
wait with the listing.
The empirical implications of our theory are largely supported by the evidence. First,
our model can endogenously produce a plausible life cycle of the …rm: entrepreneurs wait
until they take …rms public (or may not go public at all), divest a certain stake at the IPO
and divest thereafter in the secondary market (or through seasoned o¤erings) but do not
completely exit unless there is also a change in control. The analysis also rationalizes the
use of venture capital before the going public as a way to reduce commitment problems.
Furthermore, our theory can explain the operating underperformance of IPO’s as a result
of lowered entrepreneurial incentives, which stem from a reduction in the entrepreneur’s
stake in the …rm at the IPO. Another prediction of our model is that there should be a
positive relationship between the degree of ownership by the entrepreneur and the operating
performance. There is some evidence for that.1 We also derive some appealing predictions
regarding the relationship between the costs of going public and the age of public …rms
and between the timing of going public and the amount of divestment at the IPO.
We show that the entrepreneur’s divestment plan is (constrained)-ine¢cient (i.e., in-
1Jain and Kini (1994) …nd indeed such a relation for U.S. IPO’s, and Holthausen and Larcker (1996)
for reverse leveraged buy-outs. Moreover, Downes and Heinkel (1982) …nd that the share of equity retained
at the IPO is related to the valuation of the …rm (on the other hand, Pagano et. al., 1995, and Mikkelson
et. al., 1997, …nd no relationship between ownership and performance).
2e¢cient beyond the moral hazard problem): the entrepreneur divests too much and too
late and as a consequence too few …rms go public. This in contrast to single-trade models,
in which the stock market has been shown to operate e¢ciently (Kocherlakota, 1998, and
Magill and Quinzii, 1999 and 2001). This ine¢ciency provides a rationale for IPO-lockup
periods because they can act as a commitment device that can improve the entrepreneur’s
divestment plan. We furthermore derive a proposal for …nancial regulation that completely
restores e¢ciency without reducing ‡exibility. This is achieved by requiring the entrepre-
neur to divest through existing shareholders, which forces the entrepreneur to internalize
the adverse e¤ects of divestment on the existing shareholders. Besides, our analysis also
makes a strong case for disclosure and trading size restrictions for insiders: both disclosure
of trades and limitations on the size of trades are needed to make a stock market operative
in the absence of the ability of entrepreneurs to commit themselves to future divestment.
There has been surprisingly little theoretic research into the go public of …rms. Most
closely related to our analysis is probably the signalling theory by Leland and Pyle (1977).
In this theory the equity retained by the entrepreneur serves as a signal for the quality of
the …rm and does therefore also predict a relationship between the IPO retention and …rm
performance thereafter. There is furthermore a strand of the literature that emphasizes
the informational aspects of the stock market and relates it to the timing of going public
(Ellingson and Rydqvist, 1997 , Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999, Titman and Subrah-
manyam, 1999, and Maksimovic and Pichler, 2001). In Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999)
the entrepreneur faces a trade-o¤ between lower …nancing costs (compared to venture capi-
talist …nancing) and higher informational costs when going public. Ellingson and Rydqvist
(1997) present a model in which trading at the stock market produces information that
helps to reduce adverse selection. The initial owner may therefore prefer to …rst sell a part
of the stake at the IPO and sell further shares later under more favorable informational
conditions. Change of control has also been emphasized as a motive for going public (Zin-
gales, 1995, Mello and Parsons, 1998). This papers argue that the initial owner maximizes
the proceeds from selling the …rm by di¤erentiating between investors, which usually leads
to selling the …rm in di¤erent stages. For example, in Mello and Parsons (1998) the initial
owner uses the IPO to sell shares to small and passive investors, while the marketing of
controlling blocks occurs separately.2 The analysis in this paper di¤ers from the above
contributions in that we explain the timing of the going public with a trade-o¤ between
entrepreneurs’ incentives to sell their …rms as soon as possible and distortions arising from
2There is also a large literature on underpricing which generally emphasizes adverse selection (Chemma-
nur, 1993, Grinblatt and Wang, 1989, and Welch, 1989). A notable exemption are Stoughton and Zechner
(1998). In their model oversubscription of the IPO is used by the owner to di¤erentiate between investors
in order to reduce monitoring.
3an ine¢cient divestment plan.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the static
divestment problem under moral hazard. Section II extends to a dynamic framework and
studies secondary market trading. Section III derives the implications for the life cycle
of the …rm and the decision to go public. Section IV and V contain empirical and policy
implications, respectively. The …nal section concludes.
I. The Stock Market and Entrepreneurial Incentives
Consider an entrepreneur (denoted E) who has founded a …rm at time t = 0 that yields
a pay-o¤ f at t = 1. The pay-o¤ depends on the e¤ort e exercised by the entrepreneur,
speci…cally we assume that f = e. E¤ort is chosen at time of production (t = 1) and
gives disutility of c(e) = e2=2. The entrepreneur maximizes wealth and discounts time
with ¯ (¯ < 1). There are a large number of investors that maximize wealth but do not
discount time. This is a simple way to model an incentive for the entrepreneur to sell the
…rm to investors (the incentive is motivated by the fact that an entrepreneur is exposed
to …rm-speci…c risk and often cash-constrained while investors are typically well diversi…ed
and liquid).3 Ideally, the entrepreneur would like to sell the whole …rm at t = 0. We
assume that the entrepreneur’s …rm-speci…c abilities and further costs rule out a complete
exit (including a transfer of managerial responsibilities and control). The entrepreneur
can, however, sell cash-‡ow rights (shares) to the investors at the beginning of the period.
In doing so, E faces the following problem. If she sells a part of the …rm, she participates
less in the …rm’s pay-o¤ and has less incentives to exercise e¤ort. Although the investors
cannot observe e¤ort, it is assumed that they can observe how much of the …rm is sold by
the entrepreneur (this assumption will be discussed below). Consequently, investors lower
their valuation of the …rm when the entrepreneur reduces her stake in anticipation of a
lower e¤ort choice. This poses a restriction to E’s divestment. In fact, E faces a trade-o¤
between the gains from divestment (given by the discount factor 1 ¡ ¯) and distortions
arising from the fact that her e¤ort choice has to be incentive compatible.
More speci…cally, if all parameters of the model are common knowledge and the share
µ of the …rm that is retained by the entrepreneur is observable, investors can fully infer the
e¤ort the entrepreneur will exercise. Investors are assumed to be competitive. The price
p of the …rm will then be exactly f(e e), where e e is the entrepreneur’s e¤ort choice given µ.
3The assumption of a constant ¯ is for simpli…cation only. Generally, diversi…cation and liquidity
motives would imply that ¯ increases when the entrepreneur sells a part of the …rm. The consequences of
this are discussed at then end of the next section.
4The two-stage maximization problem faced by the entrepreneur is
max0·µ·1fÁ(µ;e e) = (1 ¡ µ)p(e e) + ¯[µf(e e) ¡ e e2
2 ]g, s:t:
(i) e e = argmaxe¸0fµf(e) ¡ e2
2 g,
(ii) p(e e) = f(e e) (iii) f(e e) = e e (1)
The …rst part of the objective function Á are the proceeds from sale of the …rm, the
second part is the net bene…t from production discounted at ¯. Condition (i) requires the
e¤ort choice to be incentive compatible, (ii) states that investors correctly anticipate the
production of the …rm and (iii) is the assumed production function.
Proposition 1 (optimal divestment) The entrepreneur retains a share of µ = 1=(2 ¡ ¯)
in the …rm.
Proof. With f(e e) = e e (condition (iii)) it follows from (i) that e e = µ. From (ii) we
have p(e e) = f(e e) = µ. The FOC for the objective function is then 1 ¡ 2µ + ¯[2µ ¡ µ] = 0.
Solving for µ yields µ = 1=(2 ¡ ¯).
As argued above, the moral hazard problem prevents complete divestment. An inter-
esting question is whether the choice of µ is e¢cient, in the sense that a social planner who
has to respect the limited availability of assets (shares) and the unobservability of e¤ort
cannot improve the allocation.4 The answer is yes. The intuition is that the negative ex-
ternalities, which arise because a sale of shares reduces the incentives for the entrepreneur
and lowers the pay-o¤ for all shareholders, are fully internalized through a reduction in the
price of the …rm. In fact, Magill and Quinzii (1999, 2001) (and also Kocherlakota, 1998)
have shown in a more general framework with uncertainty that a stock market solves the
trade-o¤ between the gains from trade and distorting incentives in an optimal way.
This analysis rests on two crucial assumptions. First, investors can observe trades.
Since the …rm’s price depends on the share of the …rm sold by the entrepreneur, investors
have to know this share when making their trades (in the model all trades takes place
simultaneously). This is not a cause for concern for IPO’s, where the amount of shares
o¤ered is …xed or governed by rules. For the secondary market, one can argue that disclo-
sure requirements for insiders coupled with quantitative trading restrictions make trades
de facto observable. However, this is generally only ex-post disclosure.5 This means that
an investor that buys shares cannot observe whether the entrepreneur simultaneously sells
to other investors and is therefore not able to price the shares correctly. The second crucial
assumption is that trade only takes place once. Again, this is reasonable for IPO’s but
4This is the concept of constrained pareto-e¢ciency dating back to Diamond (1967)
5For a discussion of the observability of trades see Kocherlakota (1998) and Magill and Quinzii (1999).
5does not …t with secondary market trading. If there are multiple trading opportunities,
investors face the danger that the entrepreneur divests subsequent to their investment. In
fact, if the entrepreneur in our model were unexpectedly allowed to retrade, she would
divest further.
Proposition 2 (retrade) Given that the entrepreneur has an initial share of µ0 (0 < µ0 ·
1) in the …rm, she retains a share of µ = µ0=(1 ¡ 2¯) (< µ0 for ¯ < 1) after trade.
Proof. analogous to Proposition 1 (the entrepreneur maximizes now (µ0 ¡ µ)p(e e) +
¯[µf(e e) ¡ e e2=2] s.t. conditions (i)-(iii) in (1)).
The intuition for this result is that a reduction in the entrepreneur’s stake in the …rm
only a¤ects the price of the shares the entrepreneur is currently selling (µ0¡µ) but not the
ones she has already sold (1 ¡ µ0). Thus her costs of divestment decrease and she divests
more. According to Proposition 2, in…nitely many (unexpected) trading opportunities
would drive the share the entrepreneur retains to zero (since she only retains a fraction of
her initial stake in the …rm in every trading period).
II. The Dynamic Divestment Problem
In practice investors do of course know that entrepreneurs can divest at later stages (for
example through seasoned o¤erings). They will therefore lower their valuation for shares
of the …rm. In this section we study how this will a¤ect the amount and the timing of
divestment by the entrepreneur and whether the outcome remains e¢cient. We do that by
extending the model for continuous time trading.
Firm’s pay-o¤ arises now after a period of length n. During this period the …rm can be
traded continuously. E¤ort is chosen after trading. The entrepreneur discounts with the
continuous time discount factor ± (± > 0), investors continue to have no time preference.
The …rm is priced competitively by the investors for any trade during the period according
to E’s anticipated divestment path given her share in the …rm µ(t) prior trading (thus the
price of shares in a trade does not depend on the amount of the …rm divested at that point
of time). We require µ(t) to be di¤erentiable.6 Since the divestment path will be correctly
6Note that this does not restrict the amount that can be sold by the entrepreneur since there is a
continuum of trading opportunities. However, it implies that the entrepreneur cannot divest large amounts
without being observed (in the next section we study the IPO and allow also for discrete divestment). This
is motivated by disclosure requirements for large shareholders that are in place in many countries. For
example, in the U.S. owners of more than 10% of a stock have to disclose their trades (ex-post). Coupled
with market liquidity restrictions, this e¤ectively prevents the large shareholder from divesting large stakes
without being noticed.
6anticipated by the investors, the price of the …rm in equilibrium is constant over time. The
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(iii) p(e e) = f(e e) (iv) f(e e) = e e (v) µ(0) = 1 (2)
The objective function Á is the continuous time generalization of the objective function
from problem (1) with the initial condition µ(0) = 1. Condition (i), (iii) and (iv) are as in
the static optimization problem. Condition (ii) rules out any time-inconsistent divestment
paths by requiring that the chosen path is optimal at any point in time. Time inconsistency
arises because the price of a share in a trade depends on divestment decisions that take place
after the trade. Given her time preference, E would like to commit herself to a divestment
path with a certain divestment at t = 0 but no divestment thereafter. However, once E
has divested, she has an incentive to divest further (as Proposition 2 states). Investors will
anticipate that and price the …rm according to a time consistent divestment path.
Proposition 3 (divestment path) The entrepreneur divests a constant amount µ
0(t) =
¡±=(1 + ±n) at any point in time and remains a share of µ(n) = 1=(1 + ±n) after trading.
Proof. See Appendix.
The reason why E divests in pieces and not all at once arises from her motive for
retrade (Proposition 2). After she has sold an amount of the …rm, she has an incentive to
sell more of the …rm. This is the case because when she retains less of the …rm, her costs
of divestment in terms of a reduction in the proceeds from future sales are reduced. In
that way, any divestment creates a new incentive for divestment and leads to a divestment
path. Rationality requires that investors anticipate subsequent divestment and lower their
valuation of the …rm. The restriction to small amounts of divestment at any point of time
coupled with the fact that E fully internalizes the e¤ect of her divestment on the proceeds
from future sales, prevent a complete sale of the …rm during the trading period. Thus,
production of the …rm will be positive and investors are prepared to pay for the …rm (which,
in turn, makes it worthwhile for E to sell).
The speed of divestment jµ
0(t)j = ±=(1+±n) increases with the ±, the costs of deferring
divestment. The length of the trading period n only in‡uences divestment in so far as it
7changes the factor at which the …nal pay-o¤ is discounted (e¡±n). If one sets the discount
factor to ± := ±
¤=n (which makes the present value of the …nal pay-o¤ independent of the
length of the period), the share retained by E is µ(n) = 1=(1+ ±
¤) and independent of the
length of the trading period.
The existence of a divestment path is potentially relevant for the equity premium.
Kocherlakota (1998) and Magill and Quinzii (1999, 2001) have studied the equity premium
in a general equilibrium model with a single trading period and have found that the in-
troduction of moral hazard reduces the ability of the model to produce high premiums.
Matters are likely to change in dynamic setting with moral hazard. This is because the
presence of a divestment path leads to a reduction of prices in anticipation of a drop in per-
formance in the future (due to future divestment). This may lead to lower price-earnings
multiples since they are computed from current earnings.
We have argued in the previous section that the divestment chosen by the entrepreneur
leads to constrained-e¢ciency. In the dynamic setting this is not the case anymore, i.e., a
social planner that has to respect the unobservability of e¤ort and the availability of assets
(shares) can improve the allocation by setting a di¤erent divestment path.
Proposition 4 (dynamic ine¢ciency) For n > 0: (i) the solution to (2) is
constrained-ine¢cient; (ii) the e¢cient allocation is that divestment only takes place at
t = 0 with a share of µ
¤ = 1=(2 ¡ e¡±n) being retained; (iii) compared to the second best
solution, E divests excessively, i.e., µ(n) < µ
¤.
Proof. See Appendix.
The non-optimality of the decentralized solution stems from the fact that the entrepre-
neur cannot commit herself to future trading. As a consequence she faces a lower valuation
of her …rm than what would be justi…ed by her current stake in the …rm. This restrains her
from divesting the optimal amount immediately. Her motive for retrade, however, gives
her an incentive to divest after the IPO. This causes an ine¢cient timing of the sales of
the …rm because she has a preference for time vis-à-vis the investors. Moreover, since for
any t > 0 she does not fully internalize the agency costs of a reduction in her stake in the
…rm (she does not take into account the shares that are already sold), she divests in total
more than the optimal amount.
We have simpli…ed the analysis signi…cantly be assuming a constant discount factor
¯. One can reasonably argue that a reduction in µ reduces both the need for obtaining
liquidity (because the entrepreneur has already partly cashed in) as well as the costs of a
unit of …rm-speci…c risk and hence @µ=@¯ < 0. In the static framework (Proposition 1),
this does not cause any consequences as long as ¯ · 1. For the divestment path, there
8are two e¤ects. First, since as µ decreases also ¯ decreases, the potential bene…ts from
further divestment are reduced, which makes the divestment path more convex. Second,
as ¯ decreases, also the dynamic ine¢ciency is decreased since investors realize that the
entrepreneur now has less incentives to sell subsequently. This may increase the incentives
to sell and make µ(t) more concave. The net e¤ects will depend on the exact speci…cation
of ¯(µ).
III. The Decision to Go Public and the Life Cycle of
the Firm
In the preceding section we have studied the dynamic aspects of stock market trading
under moral hazard. Since trade as an entrepreneurial …rm is only one of the possible
stages in the life cycle of …rm, the bene…ts at this stage interact with decisions made by
the entrepreneur at other stages. In order to study this interaction, we embed the previous
analysis in the life cycle of the …rm.
The life cycle of a …rm is typically characterized by a phase of full private …nancing
after the setup. Then, a venture capitalist may obtain a stake in the …rm. At some point of
time, the entrepreneur may decide to take the …rm public with an IPO, to be followed by
secondary market trading. Eventually, as a last stage in the transformation from a purely
entrepreneurial …rm to a professionally managed corporation, the …rm may get acquired,
for example by a corporate raider. In the following, we focus on how the decision to go
public arises as a consequence of the dynamic ine¢ciency faced by the entrepreneur when
selling the …rm (venture capitalism and change of control are discussed at the end of the
section)
We …rst extend the model from the previous section to two divestment stages: IPO and
secondary market trading. The entrepreneur can …rst sell shares at the IPO and can then
trade during a period of length n (the trading phase is identical to the model from the
previous section). The di¤erence between secondary market trading and an IPO is that in
the latter a large number of shares are sold at one point of time. Moreover, the number of
shares being sold at an IPO is generally known to investors and will a¤ect the price of a
share at the IPO (which compares to instantaneous disclosure for second market trading).
Corollary 5 The entrepreneur sells 1 ¡µ(0) = 1¡ (1 + ±n)=(e¡±n + 2±n) at the IPO and
retains a share of µ(n) = 1=(e¡±n + 2±n) after trading.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 5 uses a generalization of Proposition 3, namely that the entrepreneur divests
9a constant fraction of her initial stake µ(0) (which is now di¤erent from1) during the trading
period. At the time of IPO the entrepreneur simply chooses the optimal initial stake µ(0)
for the divestment path. The utility arising from this divestment pattern can be used to
compute the gains from gain public (the alternative of staying private being that the whole
…rm has to be kept until production takes place).
Proposition 6 (the gains from going public) The gains from going public b(n) follow an
hump-shape on [0;1) and are zero for n = 0 and n ! 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is as follows. The gains from going public are low in
early stages of the life when production is far o¤ (n large). This is because the entrepreneur
has then a strong desire to cash in. Investors anticipate this and since the entrepreneur
cannot commit herself to keeping a stake in the …rm, they will pay a low price for shares
of the …rm. This e¤ect on the …rm’s price outweighs the potentially high bene…ts from
selling the …rm and makes the gains from going public initially low. As time passes by
(n decreases) the time inconsistency problem is reduced because the entrepreneur has a
greater interest in keeping a stake in the …rm. Investors will value the …rm higher and the
gains from going public increase initially. However, as the time of production approaches,
also the relative valuation of the …rm by the entrepreneur vis-á-vis investors increases (since
production is discounted less). This e¤ect eventually outweighs the reduction in the time
inconsistency problem and the gains from going public fall. At then end of the trading
period, the gains from going public are zero.
On the contrary, if there is no time inconsistency the bene…ts from going public are
always decreasing with the age of the …rm (n increases) (the only e¤ect of n on the gains
from going public is then through a change in the discount factor e¡±n). The entrepreneur
would then choose to go public immediately after the foundation of the …rm or remain
private forever if the costs of going public exceed the initial gains from going public. In the
absence of commitment, however, the entrepreneur may postpone listing until the bene…ts
b(n) exceed the costs. If the gains at their maximum are still lower than the costs of going
public, the …rm will remain private forever.
The dynamic ine¢ciency of E’s divestment furthermore gives rise to a plausible role
for venture-capitalism and a transfer of control during the life cycle. In contrast to small
shareholders, venture capitalists are usually active investors. They often have a seat in the
board and can for example make future increases in their stake in the …rm contingent on
the performance of the …rm. Consequently, venture capitalists have some in‡uence over
the entrepreneur and are at least partly able to force the entrepreneur to internalize the
e¤ect of a reduction in her stake on the value of the venture capitalist’s stake.
10Venture capitalism can be modelled as follows. Assume for simplicity that the entrepre-
neur can fully commit herself vis-á-vis the venture capitalists. There is then no dynamic
ine¢ciency from divestment (through the venture capitalist). Assume furthermore that
venture capitalists require a premium for the large exposure to …rm speci…c risk and the
illiquidity of their stake (compared to investors that can fully diversify and have a market
to trade their assets). Their valuation of the …rm will therefore be lower than for investors
but still larger than for the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur may then sell a stake to a
venture capitalist in early stages of the …rm when the dynamic ine¢ciency is high (they
e¤ectively reduce the discount factor for the entrepreneur). Since the valuation of the …rm
by investors is still higher than for the venture capitalists, the entrepreneur may still take
the …rm public in later stages (when dynamic ine¢ciency is reduced). To the contrary, in
the absence of the dynamic ine¢ciency venture capitalism and going public cannot jointly
occur during the life cycle. This is because the entrepreneur goes either public immediately
(with no need for venture capital then) or remains private forever (possibly with venture
capital …nancing).
We assumed that e¢ciency losses (due to the loss of the …rm-speci…c abilities of the
entrepreneur and/or agency costs under the new form of ownership and control) make a
transfer of control initially undesirable. If the …rm goes public the productive opportunities
of the …rm are less and less exploited when the entrepreneur reduces her stake (since e¤ort
is reduced). At a certain point this may make it worthwhile to sell the whole …rm to an
investor even though there are e¢ciency losses involved in the transfer of control. In our
view of the …rm, this represents the …nal stage in the life cycle (only to be followed by
liquidation of the …rm). Again, if there were no time-inconsistency a change in control
would either take place right after the setup of the …rm or never. This is because in
absence of frequent divestment throughout the life of the …rm, the …rm gains value for the
entrepreneur vis-á-vis investors, hence the sale of the …rm should only occur right after the
foundation.
IV. Empirical Relevance
Our theory is build around the idea that the going public decision is driven by the en-
trepreneur’s desire to divest the …rm. There is indeed broad evidence that owners reduce
their holdings substantially at the IPO and thereafter. For example, Mikkelson et. al.,
1997, report for U.S. IPO’s that the stake of insiders declines from 68% to 18% during the
…rst 10 years after the IPO (however, this prediction is common to all models stressing the
11sale of the …rm as the motive for the going public decision, e.g., Zingales, 1995).7 Since
a reduction in ownership increases incentive problems, our model moreover implies that
the operating performance of …rms drops after the going public. There is overwhelming
evidence for this phenomenon (see for example Jain and Kini, 1994, Holthausen and Lar-
cker, 1996, and Mikkelson et. al., 1997). Alternatively, a drop in operating performance
can also emerge if owners time the IPO to let it coincide with a peak in the performance
of the …rm (Ritter, 1984) or if window-dressing is used. More speci…cally, however, our
theory furthermore predicts a relationship between the amount of equity retained by the
entrepreneur and the operating performance of the …rm. In their study of U.S. IPO’s,
Jain and Kini (1994 ) report that there is a signi…cant positive relation between post-IPO
operating performance and the amount of divestment by entrepreneurs. Holthausen and
Larcker (1996) …nd similar results in their study of reverse leveraged buy-outs (RLBO’s).
With a more general focus, Mikkelson and Partch (1985) and Wruck (1989) …nd a positive
relation between ownership concentration and performance of public …rm. On the con-
trary, Mikkelson et. al. (1995) and Pagano et. al. (1995) do not …nd a relation between
ownership structure and post-IPO operating performance.8
A further prediction of our model is that due the dynamic inconsistency, the entrepre-
neur does not solely divest at the IPO. Many studies report that the share divested by the
original owners at the IPO is not very large but that after some years the entrepreneur has
divested a substantial amount. In the sample of Mikkelson et. al., 1997, 24% is divested
at IPO and 26% in the next ten years, other studies report that the entrepreneur sells very
few at the IPO (for example Rydqvist, 1995). Furthermore, the presence of moral hazard
in our model implies that the owner does not completely divest (at least not as long as the
…rm operates independently). This hypothesis is not obtained by other theories stressing
the sale of the …rm as an important determinant of the going public decision. It also runs
counter to standard portfolio diversi…cation considerations. Although we are not aware of
direct evidence for this hypothesis, most studies …nd that the original owner still remains
a signi…cant stake in the …rm even after many years (18% in Mikkelson’s study).
It is generally appealing that our simple model produces a plausible life cycle of the
…rm with the stages venture capitalism, going public (with an IPO and secondary market
trading) and eventually acquisition by another …rm. We are not aware of other papers that
can reproduce such a life cycle of the …rm with a single model. The plausibility of the life
7Similar results are obtained by Rydqvist and Högholm (1995) and Brennan and Franks (1997) for
Sweden and the U.K., respectively.
8A relation between equity retention and …rm performance is also predicted by Leland and Pyle (1977).
In their adverse selection model the entrepreneur has superior information about the …rms prospects. The
share retained serves as a signal for quality.
12cycle arising from the model also indicates that the dynamic ine¢ciency in divestment is
indeed relevant for the life cycle. This is because, as we argued in the previous section, all
stages would collapse to the time immediately after the foundation in the absence of a lack
of commitment (and could furthermore no co-exist).
Our model furthermore predicts a relationship between the costs of going public and
the age of public …rms.
Proposition 7 (waiting time) An increase in the costs of going public increases the waiting
time until going public (provided the …rm goes public).
Proof. See Appendix.
U.S. stock markets are considered to provide cheap access to capital compared to Eu-
ropean markets, one would therefore expect U.S. …rms going public earlier than European
…rms. Quite strikingly, Pagano et. al. (1995 ) report an average age of 33 years for …rms
that went public in Italy (similar numbers are obtained by Rydqvist, 1995, for Sweden)
compared to 11 years for the U.S. (Gompers, 1996 ).
The dynamic ine¢ciency in divestment has also an implication for the relationship
between the timing of going public and the entrepreneur’s divestment.
Proposition 8 (divestment behavior) Firms that go public later divest either moderately
or aggressively in contrast to …rms that go public early.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 8 underlies that both …rms with low and high ± have low bene…ts from going
public. This is not surprising for …rms with low ± because then the potential gains from
going public are low. However, also high-± …rms have low bene…ts since the entrepreneurs
of such …rms have a strong motive to divest, hence they face a higher time inconsistency
problem. The arising e¢ciency losses outweigh the higher potential bene…ts from going
public that come with a high ± (for the same reason are the gains from going public low
in an early stage in the life of the …rm). Thus …rms that need the stock exchange most
get listed at late stages in their live (or even remain private)! We are not aware of any
direct evidence for (or against) the above relationship but it could possibly account for the
observed diversity in …rms that remain private (as noted in Pagano et. al., 1995).
In the next section we show that a lock-up period in which insiders agree to refrain from
divesting during a speci…ed time after an IPO can actually reduce the time inconsistency
problem. We would thus expect that …rms for which the inconsistency problem is less
pronounced to make less use of lock-up periods. This should be the case for …rms with
venture capital. Since venture capitalists have an interest in keeping the value of their
13stake, they will (as argued in V) use their power (for example board participation) to
avoid actions by the entrepreneur that are detrimental to the …rm’s performance, i.e.,
excessive divestment. Correspondingly, Brav and Gompers (2000 ) …nd that …rms that are
not backed by a venture capitalist have on average longer lock-up periods (however, Brav
and Gompers consider adverse selection as the explanation for lock-up periods).
Lastly, our model implies that the valuation (as measured, for example, by P/E-ratios)
should be higher for …rms with low ±. This is because these …rms have lower divestment
and their performance is expected to drop less relative to …rms with higher ±. Since …rms
with lower ± divest also a lower amount at the IPO (Corollary 5), we should see a positive
relationship between the amount of equity retained after IPO and the valuation of the …rm
at IPO. Downes and Heinkel test this prediction for U.S. IPO’s (which also arises from the
Leland-Pyle-model) and …nd clear evidence of such a relationship.
V. Policy Implications
The preceding section has shown that the evidence broadly supports our model, which is
driven by the inability of the stock market to provide an e¢cient transfer of ownership. In
the following we examine whether regulations can reduce this ine¢ciency.
Our analysis makes obviously a strong case for requiring disclosure and limiting the
size of trades by insiders. Such regulations are commonplace at major exchanges. If there
is no disclosure, the entrepreneur could completely divest without the investors noticing
it. The disciplining e¤ect of a price drop in the shares on future divestment is then absent.
Knowing this, investors will not trade with the entrepreneur. Disclosure, however, is not
su¢cient to avoid market breakdown. Regulation has also to ensure that the amount which
can be divested by the entrepreneur at one point of time is small. The intuition for this is
given by Proposition 2, which states that the entrepreneur would like to divest a fraction
of her stake at every trading opportunity. For continuously traded …rms, the entrepreneur
could then completely exit during the trading period. This again rules out any divestment
in equilibrium.
Since the dynamic ine¢ciency arises from a lack of commitment with respect to future
divestment, any device that allows the entrepreneur to commit herself can enhance e¢-
ciency. For example, it is common practice that insiders agree at the IPO on a so-called
lock-up period (usually 180 days), during which they are barred from trading shares. A
prominent argument for lock-up periods is that any unfavorable information being with-
held by the insiders at the IPO will be disclosed during that period. A lock-up period
can then limit the adverse a¤ects of insider information (for example Brav and Gompers,
142000). However, a lock-up period also increases e¢ciency by reducing time inconsistency.
Proposition 9 (lock-up period) Committing not to trade during a period k > 0 after IPO
increases the utility of the entrepreneur.
Proof. See Appendix.
In our model, an increase in the duration of the lock-up period is always e¢ciency
enhancing because it enables the entrepreneur to choose a more e¢cient timing of divest-
ment. This will not necessarily be the case if there are losses due to reduced ‡exibility
arising from the commitment. For example, the entrepreneur may want to divest in order
to adjust to new information. In general, lock-up periods will pose a trade-o¤ between
‡exibility and e¢ciency. This makes lock-up periods and other commitment devices that
simply rule out trading during a certain period an inappropriate tool to deal entirely with
the time inconsistency problem.
Is it possible to enhance the e¢ciency of stock market trading without losing ‡exibility?
This would require that the entrepreneur can divest at any time but also has to ensure
that she internalizes the e¤ect of divestment on existing shareholders. In the following we
propose a mechanismthat fully restores (constrained) e¢ciency without reducing ‡exibility.
The underlying idea is simple: the entrepreneur can divest at any time but has to do
so through existing shareholders. Consider, for example, the case of a single existing
shareholder. If the entrepreneur sells shares to this shareholder, the shareholder will price
the reduction in the value of the shares already owned into the transaction. Since the
entrepreneur has no other means of divesting, the shareholder cannot be made worse o¤
and any e¢ciency loss through a reduced stake will be internalized. The story becomes
more complicated if there are several shareholders. This is because a single shareholder
will fail to internalize the e¤ect a transaction has on other shareholders. Therefore, the
entrepreneur has to make a joint o¤er to all shareholders in order to achieve a complete
internalization. Consider the following mechanism. An entrepreneur who wants to sell at
t proposes an amount µ(t) ¡ µ
¤(t) she wishes to sell (where µ(t) is her current stake) and
a price p to the shareholders. If all shareholders agree the o¤er is accepted and every
shareholder buys a fraction of µ(t) ¡ µ
¤(t) according to his share in the outside equity
(1 ¡ µ(t)) at price p. Otherwise, the o¤er is rejected and no divestment takes place.
Proposition 10 (divestment o¤er) If an o¤er (µ(t) ¡ µ
¤(t);p¤) is accepted, it does not
change the total wealth of the investors.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 10 states that the entrepreneur fully internalizes any e¤ect of her divest-
ment on the wealth of the investors. Moreover, since the share transactions take place in
15proportion to every investors’ stake in the …rm, there is no divergence between the investors:
either the o¤er is accepted or turned down unanimously.9 As in the previous analysis, the
entrepreneur does not have to share any surplus with the investors (since investors do not
behave strategically). Consequently, every divestment that can increase the utility of the
entrepreneur without reducing the wealth of the investors will take place; the divestment
will therefore be constrained pareto-e¢cient. Another way to put this is the following.
Since investors know that they will be fully compensated for any divestment taking place
in the future, they will price the shares according to the entrepreneur’s current stake in
the …rm. Hence there is no time-inconsistency problem. The advantage of this mechanism
in contrast to a lock-up period is that it does not reduce the entrepreneur’s ‡exibility. For
example, the entrepreneur could react to an unexpected change in her discount rate (e.g.,
a liquidity shock) by selling shares through an o¤er.10
VI. Summary
This paper presented a new view of the life cycle of the …rm and the decision to go public;
our analysis suggested that both can be explained by a dynamic ine¢ciency arising from
a lack of commitment with respect to future divestment by the entrepreneur. Our model
is consistent with a wide range of empirical facts that otherwise can only be explained by
a combination of models. We furthermore derived implications that allow to test for more
evidence for the theory.
Our results are useful for evaluating and designing …nancial regulation. They suggest
that the fact that entrepreneurs spread their divestment over time is not an e¢cient out-
come. The analysis provides therefore a theoretic justi…cation for lock-up periods. We
have furthermore derived a mechanism that can fully restore e¢ciency without reducing
‡exibility. With respect to trading restrictions for insiders, we have identi…ed requirements
that ensure that entrepreneurs who are subject to moral hazard can divest in the absence
of commitment.
9Requiring unanimity voting among a large number of shareholders may be unreasonable in practice.
However, a less restrictive rule such as majority voting will give the same outcome since there is no
divergence among investors.
10The proposed mechanism is in fact quite similar to regulations in mainly European countries that apply
for registered increases of capital. Such regulations require that capital increases have to be accepted by
the shareholder’s meeting and include the right for every shareholder to buy a number of new shares at
a special price. Like our mechanism, the amount of shares which can be bought is proportional to the
number of shares a shareholder already holds, which ensures that any e¤ect caused by the capital increase
on shareholders (such as dilution) is internalized.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Setting f(e e) = e e in (i), taking derivative with respect to e e
and setting to zero gives µ(n)¡e e = 0 ) e e = µ(n). From (iii) and (iv) we have then p(e e) =











































































Inserting the objective function gives
dÁt¸k
dµ(k) = ¡e¡±kµ(n) +
R n
k ¡e¡±tµ
0(t)dt+ e¡±nµ(n) = 0.
Di¤erentiating with respect to k yields ±e¡dkµ(n) + e¡dkµ
0(t) = 0 ) µ
0(t) = ¡±µ(n) for
0 · t < n. For t = n de…ne µn := limt!n µ(t), µ(n) is then argmaxµ(n)f(µn ¡ µ(n))µ(n) +
µ(n)2=2g (maximization of utility in the last period) which gives µ(n) = µn, hence there
is no (discrete) end-of-period divestment. Computation of µ(n);µ
0(t);µ(t): µ(n) = 1 +
R n
0 µ
0(t)dt = 1 +
R n
0 ¡±µ(n)dt = 1 ¡ ±nµ(n) ) µ(n) = 1=(1 + ±n) ) µ
0(t) = ¡±=(1 + ±n).
The divestment path is then µ(t) = 1 +
R t
0 µ
0(s)ds = 1 ¡ ±t=(1 + ±n).
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) If we restrict us to allocations in which investors get zero
pro…ts, a constrained e¢cient solution is given by a feasible divestment path fµ(t)g0·t·1
that maximizes the objective function Á in (2) subject to condition (iii). Feasibility requires
that the incentive constraint (i) is ful…lled and that conditions (iv) and (v) are met. The
solution to (2) (Proposition 3) shows that E divests for all 0 · t · 1. The social planner
could improve the allocation by shifting divestment to time t = 0 and leave everything
else, i.e. total divestment and price unchanged. This will increase the utility of E because
she receives the proceeds from divestment earlier but leaves the position of the investors
unchanged; (ii) From (i) it is clear that a constrained-e¢cient allocation requires all trades
taking place at t = 0, i.e. µ
¤(0) = µ
¤(t) = µ
¤(n) for all 0 · t · 1 (we skip the require-
ment that µ(t) is di¤erentiable to ensure existence of the constrained-e¢cient solution).
Constrained e¢cient divestment has then to satisfy
µ
¤ = arg max
0·µ¤·1
(1 ¡ µ
¤)f(e e) + e
¡±n[µ
¤f(e e) ¡ e e
2=2]s.t. to conditions (i) and (iv) in problem (2). Using e e = µ
¤ (optimal e¤ort according to
condition (i)) and f(e e) = e e (condition (iv)), the FOC to the problem is 1 ¡ 2µ
¤ + e¡±n =
0 ) µ
¤ = 1=(2¡e¡±n); (iii) µ(n) < µ
¤ , 1=(1+±n) < 1=(2¡e¡±n) , e¡±n+±n > 1. Proof
that f(x) = e¡x + x > 1 for x > 0: f0(x) = ¡e¡x + 1 and f0(x) = 0 ) x = 0; f00(x) = e¡x
and f00(0) = 1 > 0 ) x = 0 is minimum, since f(0) = 1 it follows that e¡x + x > 1 for
x 6= 0.
Proof of Corollary 5. The entrepreneur’s objective function is










where 1 ¡ µ(0) is the share sold at the IPO and fµ
0(t)g0<t·n her divestment path in the
secondary market. Final share µ(n) given that µ(0) is retained at IPO: from Proposition
3 we have that µ
0(t) = ¡±µ(n), with µ(n) = µ(0) +
R n
0 µ
0(t)dt it follows that µ(n) =
µ(0)=(1 + ±n_ ). Choice of µ(0): the objective function Á(µ(0)) can be simpli…ed to




































(1 + ±n)(1 ¡ µ(0))µ(0) + µ(0)2(1 ¡ e¡±n=2)
(1 + ±n)2 ;
where p(e e) = µ(0), µ
0(t) = ¡±µ(n) and µ(n) = µ(0)=(1+±n) have been used. The FOC with
respect to µ(0) is: (1+±n)(1¡2µ(0))+2µ(0)(1¡e¡±n=2) = 0. Solving for µ(0) gives µ(0) =
(1+±n)=(e¡±n +2±n). From µ(n) = µ(0)=(1+±n_ ) it follows that µ(n) = 1=(e¡±n +2±n).
Proof of Proposition 6. Utility from staying private is: uP(n) = e¡n±(f(e e) ¡
e e2=2) = e¡nd=2. Utility from going public: inserting µ(0);µ(n);µ
0(t) (from Corollary 5)
in the objective function gives: uGP(n) = µ(n)=2 = 1=(2(e¡n± + 2±n)) (see Corollary 5)
) b(n) = uGP(n)¡uP(n) = (1¡2e¡2±n¡2±ne¡±n)=(2(e¡n±+2±n)). Hump-shape: to show
that b(n) has unique extremum that is a maximum on [0;1). Without loss of generality
set ± = 1 in b(n) ) FOC of b(n) wrt. to n is b0(n¤) = e¡n¤ ¡ 2 + e¡n¤(e¡n¤ + 2n¤)2 = 0.
Combining b00(n) with b0(n¤) = 0 ) b00(n¤) < 0 ) n¤ is maximum and unique. Existence
of n¤ follows from limn!1 b(n) = b(0) = 0 and b(1) ¸ 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Follows directly from the hump-shape of b(n) (Proposition
6).
Proof of Proposition 8. The gains from going public b as a function of ± exhibit
a hump-shape for ± 2 [0;1) (this follows from Proposition 6 noting that b(±;n) can be
written as b(±n)) ) …rms with high and low ± have low b(±) and thus go public later.Proof of Proposition 9. Let µ(0);µ
0(t);µ(n) the equilibrium divestment before
commitment. Consider the divestment µL(0);µ
0
L(t);µL(n) in the presence of a lock-up
period of length k with µL(t) = µ(k) for 0 · t · k and µ
0
L(t) = µ
0(t) for t > k. This
divestment is feasible since µL(t) = µ(t) during the trading period (t > k). From µL(n) =
µ(n) ) e¤
L = e¤; p(e¤
L) = p(e¤) ) total proceeds (1 ¡ µ(n))p(e¤) from selling the …rm do
not change ) present value of the proceeds increases (± > 0) since a part of the proceeds
are received earlier:
Proof of Proposition 10. We assume that an investor accepts an o¤er if it does
not reduce his wealth (consistent with the maintained assumption that investors are price
takers we rule out strategic behavior). Consider investor k who holds a share µk in the




¤(t))=(1 ¡ µ(t)) ¡ pµk(t)(µ(t) ¡ µ
¤(t))=(1 ¡ µ(t)), where µ(n) and µ
¤(n)
are according to the time-consistent divestment path with initial condition µ(t) and µ
¤(t),
respectively; w¤
k(t) ¸ wk(t) , p · [(1 ¡ µ
¤(t))µ
¤(n) ¡ (1 ¡ µ(t))µ(n)]=(µ(t) ¡ µ
¤(t)) ) p
independent of k ) o¤er accepted by all investors if p¤ · p ) E will o¤er exactly p; from
p¤ = p ) w¤
k(t) = wk(t) for arbitrary investor k ) total wealth of all investors is also
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